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ABSTRACT 
Every year governments spend their national budget on public health in order to reduce financial burden of individuals 
on health. Although it has been widely believed that the increase of public expenditure on health decreases private 
health expenditure, it has not been proved by analysis with real data. For better understanding, we conducted an em-
pirical study on the real data of 17 OECD countries-Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The panel Granger-causality test is used to verify the cause-and-effect relationship between the two expenditures. As a 
result, public expenditure on health has a 3 to 4 year-lagged negative effect on private health expenditure in the cases 
of the 16 countries except for the United States. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
When policy makers build a healthcare budget pol-
icy, they have to consider their fiscal constraint and bal-
ance between public and private expenditure. For that 
reason, it is important to better understand the relation-
ship between them. Even though it is widely believed 
that the increase of public expenditure on health de-
creases private one, it has never been proved by analysis 
with real data yet and still remains controversial. 
Tuohy et al. (2004) carried out a study to verify the 
impact of private finance on public healthcare system. 
However, the hypothesis is supposed in the opposite 
direction to ours, “Governments distribute public expen-
diture on health expecting that it should help nationals 
keep health and ease the burden of health expenditures.” 
In fact, there are several empirical studies about the rela-
tionship between healthcare expenditure and health status 
of individuals although no a consensus has been made; 
some studies have shown significant impact of health-
care spending on health of the nation (Akinkugbe and 
Afeikhena, 2006; Anyanwu and Erhijakporm, 2007) while 
others did not find any significant relationship between 
them (Musgrove, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 1998). When 
it comes to the effect of public health expenditure on the 
private health expenditure, no outstan-ding studies have 
been found yet. 
Therefore, in the present study, we focus on figur-
ing out if public expenditures on health help to decrease 
private ones or not across nations by panel data analysis 
using the empirical data of 17 OECD countries. To be 
more specific, we apply panel Granger-causality tests un-
der the assumption that there should be time lags caus-
ing preceding effects. In the area of healthcare, several 
Industrial Engineering  
& Management Systems 
Vol 14, No 1, March 2015, pp.104-110 http://dx.doi.org/10.7232/iems.2015.14.1.104
ISSN 1598-7248│EISSN 2234-6473│ © 2015 KIIE
Causality Analysis for Public and Private Expenditures on Health Using Panel Granger-Causality Test 
Vol 14, No 1, March 2015, pp.104-110, © 2015 KIIE 105
  
 
researchers have been interested in macroeconomic growth 
studies with a focus on health (Hartwig, 2010) using 
Granger-causality tests. 
The paper is organized as follow. The next section 
introduces the data and methodologies we used. Section 
3 shows the results of empirical analysis, and Section 4 
concludes.  
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Data 
To verify the causal relationship between public and 
private expenditures on health, yearly per-capita heal-th-
care expenditure by general governments and individuals 
of the 17 countries-Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States-from 1980 to 2010 were 
collected from the OECD’s Health database (in the ver-
sion of June 2013). Before the causality test, a ‘de-infla-
tion’ process is necessary to eliminate the effect by in-
flation which is irrelevant to the causality of our interest. 
To do so, we collected the inflation rate of the corre-
sponding period from the same data source and removed 
the upward trend of expenditure due to general inflation. 
Then we named the public and private expenditure on 
health of each country as PUB and PRIV respectively.  
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Panel unit root test 
Since the panel Granger-causality test requires the 
data to be stationary, the time series should be tested for 
the existence of unit roots. Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin, 
Lin and Chu, 2002) is one of the most well-known unit 
root testing methods for panel data in which the hy-
potheses are  
 
0 :H each time series contains a unit root  (1) 
1 :H each time series is stationary  
 
where the lag order is permitted to vary across individu-
als. If the null hypothesis is accepted, k-order differenc-
ing with a proper k can be taken in order to make the 
time series stationary. In the present study, we take the 
1st-order differencing 1( )t t tX X X −∇ = −  each time when 
0H  is accepted and repeat the test until it is rejected. 
  
2.2.2 Panel granger-causality test 
According to Granger (1969), a stationary time se-
ries tY  is said to ‘cause’ another stationary time series 
tX  if–under the assumption that all other information is 
irrelevant–the inclusion of past values of tY  signifi-
cantly reduces the predictive error variance of .tX  Whe-
ther tY  Granger-causes tX  is typically tested by regress-
ing tX  on its own lags and on lags of .tY  If the lags of 
tY  are found to be jointly statistically significant, then 
the hypothesis that tY  Granger-causes tX  cannot be re-
jected. Based upon that, we will estimate a time-sta-
tionary VAR (vector auto-regressive) model adapted to 
a panel context as in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) of the 
form: 
 
0 , ,1 1
m m
it i i t i l i t i i iti iX X Y uα α δ μ− −= == + + + +∑ ∑  (2) 
 
itX  and itY  respectively indicate PRIV and PUB of coun-
try i (i = 1, …, N) observed at t (t = 1, …, T) having iα  
and iδ  as their coefficients of lag l (l = 1, …, m). iμ  
stands for a country-specific mean explaining idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of each country and a disturbance 
itu  is assumed to be independently distributed across 
countries with a zero mean. The rest of information un-
explained is expressed using the constant term 0.α  
3.  RESULTS 
3.1 Panel Unit Root Test 
Before applying the panel Granger causality test, 
we conducted the panel unit root testing first. For all the 
following experiments, EViews (version 7) was used. 
Table 1 shows the result of Levin-Lin-Chu test on the 
PUB and PRIV of 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 
2010.  
As Table 1 shows, the null hypotheses are accepted 
for both PUB and PRIV so it can be said that the two 
time series are non-stationary. We take 1st-order differ-
encing for both, afterwards; the null hypotheses are re-
jected as shown in Table 2. So, we use the 1st-order dif-
ferenced value for both PUB and PRIV for the following 
analysis procedures. 
 
Table 1. Panel unit root test results (17 OECD countries, 
1980-2010) 
Levin-Lin-Chu test 
H0: Unit root in level Stat. p-value 
PUBLIC (PUB) 6.4972 1.0000 
PRIVATE (PRIV) 3.5081 0.9998 
 
Table 2. Panel unit root test results (17 OECD countries, 
1980-2010) after 1st-order differencing 
Levin-Lin-Chu test 
H0: Unit root in level Stat. p-value 
PUBLIC (PUB) -8.9743 0.0000 
PRIVATE (PRIV) -8.0846 0.0000 
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Figure 1. SIC scores according to different lag lengths. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results of Eq. (4) 
C PRIV (-1) PRIV (-2) PRIV (-3) PRIV (-4) PRIV (-5) 
9.8867*** 
(1.4676) 
0.1510 
(0.0549) 
0.0211 
(0.0548) 
-0.0787 
(0.0375) 
0.0074 
(0.0364) 
-0.1931 
(0.0365) 
PRIV (-6) PRIV (-7) PRIV (-8) PRIV (-9) PRIV (-10) PRIV (-11) 
-0.0846 
(0.0374) 
-0.0389 
(0.0376) 
-0.1041 
(0.0366) 
0.0333 
(0.0363) 
-0.0709 
(0.0356) 
-0.1108 
(0.0343) 
PUB (-1) PUB (-2) PUB (-3) PUB (-4) PUB (-5) PUB (-6) 
0.01970 
(0.0271) 
0.0214 
(0.0260) 
-0.0227 
(0.0215) 
-0.0152 
(0.0199) 
0.0195 
(0.0201) 
-0.0135 
(0.0202) 
PUB (-7) PUB (-8) PUB (-9) PUB (-10) PUB (-11)  
-0.0158 
(0.0203) 
0.0120 
(0.0195) 
-0.0008 
(0.0192) 
0.0274 
(0.0187) 
0.0361* 
(0.0188)  
*, **, ***: Significant at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01=α  respectively. 
3.2 Model Selection  
The result of a panel Granger-causality test largely 
depends on the lag length m in the time-stationary VAR 
model given by Eq. (2). Therefore, it is important to 
appropriately specify the lag structure. We estimate the 
parameters in Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares based 
on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to choose 
the optimal lag length. Figure 1 shows SIC scores corre-
sponding to different lag lengths. In general, an optimal 
lag length may be set shorter than 5 to build a stable 
model so that it seems reasonable to choose lag 1 of the 
smallest SIC in that region, however, we also consider 
lag 11 since PUB may have a long term effect on PRIV. 
Actually, the model with lag 11 has the lowest SIC score.  
3.3 Panel Granger-Causality Test 
First, we have a model with lag 1 as follows: 
 
0 , 1 ,it i t i t i i itX X Y uα α δ μ− −= + + + +    (3)  
 
We estimated the parameters of Eq. (3) and the re-
sults are shown in Table 3. As we can see, no explana-
tory variables have significant effects on PRIV.  
 
Table 3. Estimation results for Eq. (3) 
 C PUBLIC(-1) PRIVATE(-1)
Coefficient
Std. Error. 
6.772630***
(0.904248)
0.020286 
(0.026319) 
0.002645 
(0.049554)
*, **, ***: Significant at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01α =  respectively. 
 
With lag 11, we have a model as follows: 
 
11 11
0 , ,1 1it i i t i i i t i i iti iX X Y uα α δ μ− −= == + + + +∑ ∑    (4) 
 
The parameter estimation results of Eq. (4) are 
shown in Table 4. PUB of lag 11 has a significant effect 
on PRIV at 0.10.α =   
3.4 Robustness Test 
Since a panel data analysis is highly sensitive to 
outliers, tests are necessary to verify robustness of the 
models and to find out outliers. For all the 17 countries, 
leave-one-out re-estimations of Eq. (4) for lag 11, which 
has the minimum SIC score, were conducted by drop-
ping each country in turn. As a result, it turns out that 
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Table 5. Robustness test for cross-national stability of parameters of Eq. (4)  
(a) Re-estimation results excluding the United States         (b) Re-estimation results excluding Austria 
The United States excluded Austria excluded 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
C 6.138571*** 1.208443 C 9.998630*** 1.437171 
DPUB(-1) 0.013706 0.024021 DPUB(-1) 0.014569 0.028184 
DPUB(-2) 0.012208 0.023072 DPUB(-2) 0.037680 0.028163 
DPUB(-3) -0.032005* 0.019242 DPUB(-3) -0.029309 0.022255 
DPUB(-4) -0.030330* 0.018190 DPUB(-4) -0.018701 0.020734 
DPUB(-5) 0.012116 0.018502 DPUB(-5) 0.019406 0.020961 
DPUB(-6) -0.018470 0.018550 DPUB(-6) -0.016808 0.021102 
DPUB(-7) -0.017248 0.018734 DPUB(-7) -0.014309 0.021233 
DPUB(-8) -0.003027 0.017756 DPUB(-8) 0.016723 0.020199 
DPUB(-9) -0.011276 0.017528 DPUB(-9) -0.004697 0.019922 
DPUB(-10) 0.025566 0.016955 DPUB(-10) 0.019987 0.019272 
DPUB(-11) 0.022656 0.016933 DPUB(-11) 0.041653** 0.019319 
DPRI(-1) 0.041968 0.057867 DPRI(-1) 0.153753*** 0.055951 
DPRI(-2) 0.035827 0.055773 DPRI(-2) 0.050282 0.057392 
DPRI(-3) 0.043873 0.053050 DPRI(-3) -0.088445** 0.037960 
DPRI(-4) 0.097666* 0.052347 DPRI(-4) 0.003465 0.036841 
DPRI(-5) -0.051743 0.053878 DPRI(-5) -0.201034*** 0.037053 
DPRI(-6) -0.003308 0.053669 DPRI(-6) -0.095797** 0.038291 
DPRI(-7) -0.021805 0.054324 DPRI(-7) -0.034451 0.038205 
DPRI(-8) -0.003231 0.052096 DPRI(-8) -0.116159*** 0.037242 
DPRI(-9) 0.058958 0.050571 DPRI(-9) 0.023850 0.036982 
DPRI(-10) -0.060053 0.050301 DPRI(-10) -0.067162* 0.036234 
DPRI(-11) 0.004706 0.046290 DPRI(-11) -0.140528*** 0.035663 
*, **, ***: Significant at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01α =  respectively. 
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Figure 2. PUB and PRIV of the 17 OECD countries (1980-2010). 
the model is indeed sensitive to some extent to the ex-
clusion of several countries such as Ireland, Norway, 
Japan and the United States while the results of the other 
cases are similar to each other. When excluding each of 
the first three countries, relatively small difference turns 
out that DPUB(-11) has no significant effect. In contrast, 
the re-estimation result without the United States is far 
different from the other case as seen in Table 5. For 
comparison, the case without Austria which is one of the 
countries yielding no big differences from the others is 
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Table 6. Estimation results without the United States 
C PUB (-1) PUB (-2) PUB (-3) PUB (-4) PUB (-5) 
6.138571*** 
(1.208443) 
0.013706 
(0.024021) 
0.012208 
(0.023072) 
-0.032005* 
(0.019242) 
-0.030330* 
(0.018190) 
0.012116 
(0.018502) 
PUB (-6) PUB (-7) PUB (-8) PUB (-9) PUB (-10) PUB (-11) 
-0.018470 
(0.018550) 
-0.017248 
(0.018734) 
-0.003027 
(0.017756) 
-0.011276 
(0.017528) 
0.025566 
(0.016955) 
0.022656 
(0.016933) 
PRIV (-1) PRIV (-2) PRIV (-3) PRIV (-4) PRIV (-5) PRIV (-6) 
0.041968 
(0.057867) 
0.035827 
(0.055773) 
0.043873 
(0.053050) 
0.097666* 
(0.052347) 
-0.051743 
(0.053878) 
-0.003308 
(0.053669) 
PRIV (-7) PRIV (-8) PRIV (-9) PRIV (-10) PRIV (-11)  
-0.021805 
(0.054324) 
-0.003231 
(0.052096) 
0.058958 
(0.050571) 
-0.060053 
(0.050301) 
0.004706 
(0.046290)  
*, **, ***: Significant at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01α =  respectively. 
shown together while the rest of results for 15 countries 
is in Appendix.  
To be more specific, we compare the amount of 
PUB and PRIV of the 17 countries over 1980-2010. As 
Figure 2 shows, the United States has a distinctive pat-
tern in terms of not only the absolute scale of health 
expenditure but also the ratio between PUB and PRIV. 
Those may make the United States be an outlier from 
the other countries though further qualitative analysis is 
required for better understanding. 
So, we remove the United States and go through 
the previous procedures–unit root testing, model selec-
tion and parameter estimation - again. As same as before, 
we saw the existence of unit roots then took 1st-order 
differencing. With the differenced data, we found that 
the optimal lag length is 11 again. As a result, we ob-
tained the final estimation results for the coefficients as 
in Table 6.  
According to Table 6, in the 16 OECD countries 
except for the United States, PUB has a significant ne-
gative effect on PRIV after 3-4 years and PRIV is auto-
correlated itself with 4-year lag. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive proce-
dure of an empirical study with a panel time series data 
set to verify the effect of public health expenditure on 
the private one. By applying the panel Granger-causality 
test on the collected real data sets of 17 OECD countries, 
it turned out that public expenditure on health has a 3-4 
year-lagged negative effect on private health expendi-
ture in the cases of the 16 countries-Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom-except for the United 
States. The United States shows their own particular 
pattern which is distinctive from the other OECD coun-
tries. Further qualitative analysis on that may be helpful 
for better understanding.  
Besides the issue, what does the finding for the 16 
countries mean? Corresponding to the hypothesis we 
have tested, it turned out that the public expenditure on 
health negatively Granger-causes private health expen-
diture. However, the effect is valid after a certain time 
period rather than in immediate response to the public 
expenditure. Based upon the results of our empirical 
analysis, we estimate the length of time needed for pub-
lic expenditure to have an actual effect on the decrease 
of private expenditure as about 3-4 years.  
For future works, we have several considerations. 
In terms of methodologies, more flexible and complex 
models can be used for more elaborate analysis. For 
instance, we can relax the constraint that the optimal 
lags of PRIV and PUB in explanatory variables have to 
be set the same. If a model that has different lags for 
each of them is available, it may better explain the data. 
Further, we may also build a variety of sophisticated 
models. When it comes to selecting variables, different 
scenarios can be assumed. For the follow-up studies, we 
have some ideas of adding macroeconomic factors and 
national indices related to health such as smoking rate 
and obesity rate. Using more variables implying differ-
ent kinds of information, it is expected to explain di-
verse relationships between attributes related to national 
health.  
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